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New Jersey’s Anti-Bullying Fix: A Solution or the 
Creation of an Even Greater First Amendment Problem? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Tyler Clementi is a name that rings familiar in the ears of New 
Jersey citizens.1 His was a tragic story of the results of bullying, and 
legislators throughout the country have considered the events, which 
were followed by public outcry, and have sought to solve the bullying 
problem once and for all. Clementi was a freshman student and an 
accomplished violinist at Rutgers University who was reported to have 
jumped off the George Washington Bridge following a cyberattack by 
his roommate.2 A few nights before the suicide, his roommate had posted 
on Twitter: “Roommate asked for the room till midnight. I went into 
molly’s room and turned on my webcam. I saw him making out with a 
dude. Yay.”3 Similar stories of victimization and bullying scatter the 
media,4 and states are quickly amending current statutes and enacting 
new statutes to make anti-bullying laws in their education systems more 
severe.5 Following suit, the state of New Jersey enacted what 
commentators have called the “toughest legislation against bullying in 
 
 1. See Lisa W. Foderaro, Private Moment Made Public, Then a Fatal Jump, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 30, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/nyregion/30 suicide.html. 
 2. Although the majority of anti-bullying legislation is geared toward schools ages K–12, 
bullying incidents in universities have also helped spark legislative action. 
 3. Foderaro, supra note 1. 
 4. See John O. Hayward, Anti-Cyber Bullying Statutes: Threat to Student Free Speech, 59 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 85, 86 (2011) (Megan Meier, a thirteen-year-old girl in Missouri, committed 
suicide because of MySpace postings which said “she was a bad person whom everyone hated and 
the world would be better off without.”); Jason A. Wallace, Bullycide in American Schools: Forging 
a Comprehensive Legislative Solution, 86 IND. L.J. 735, 735 (2011) (Eric Mohat, a seventeen-year-
old Ohio student, shot himself after “a bully said . . . in front of other students, ‘Why don’t you go 
home and shoot yourself? No one would miss you.’”); Emily Bazelon, What Really Happened to 
Phoebe Prince, SLATE (July 20, 2010), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/bulle/features/2011/what_really_happened_to_phoebe_prince/the_
untold_story_of_her_suicide_and_the_role_of_the_kids_who_have_been_criminally_charged_for_it
.html (explaining the complications surrounding the bully-related suicide of Phoebe Prince, a fifteen-
year-old ninth grader who came to Massachusetts from Ireland and killed herself following the 
supposed bullying from six students); Kevin & Marilyn Ryan, Phoebe’s Legacy, THE PILOT (Bos.), 
June 4, 2010, at 13. 
 5. See Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, State Cyberbullying Laws, CYBERBULLYING 
RESEARCH CTR. (Feb. 2012), www.cyberbullying.us/Bullying_and_ Cyberbullying_Laws.pdf (last 
updated July 2012); BULLY POLICE USA, http://www.bullypolice.org/. 
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the nation.”6 
Enacted September 1, 2011, New Jersey legislators have titled the 
legislation the Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights.7 Included in this legislation 
is the requirement that schools adopt “comprehensive anti-bullying 
policies,” which include significantly increased staff training on how to 
deal with and educate against suicide and bullying, heightened deadlines 
for when and how to report bullying incidents to appointed school- and 
district-wide anti-bullying specialists, and even mandatory grade 
postings on every school and district website that gives the bully-ranking 
of that school or district.8 According to the statute, New Jersey 
legislators wished to “strengthen the standards and procedures for 
preventing, reporting, investigating, and responding to incidents of 
harassment, intimidation, and bullying of students that occur in school 
and off school premises.”9 Ergo, this legislation not only allows, but also 
encourages students, staff, and teachers to monitor and report incidents 
of all bullying or victimization—even incidents that occur off campus. 
Accordingly, the statute’s definition of “harassment, intimidation or 
bullying,” includes behavior that takes place “on school property, at any 
school-sponsored function, on a school bus, or off school grounds.”10 
While many have applauded the law’s strict requirements as a model 
for all other states to follow in cracking down on bullies,11 not everyone 
believes that it is a change for the better, and some critics consider the 
statute to be too sweeping and broad.12 For example, Richard G. Bozza, 
 
 6. Winnie Hu, Bullying Law Puts New Jersey Schools on Spot, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/31/nyregion/bullying-law-puts-new-jersey-schools-on-
spot.html?pagewanted=all; see also New Jersey’s Anti-Bullying Law Takes Effect As Students Return 
to School, CBS N.Y. (Sep. 6, 2011), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2011/09 /06/new-jerseys-anti-
bullying-law-takes-effect-as-students-return-to-school/. 
 7. Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights, Ch. 122, 2010 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. (Jan. 5, 2011 West) 
(codified as amended at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-13.1 to :37-30 (West 2011)). 
 8. Hu, supra note 6. 
 9. Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights, Ch. 122 (2)(f) (emphasis added). 
 10. Id. 122(11)(2). 
 11. Adam Cohen, Why New Jersey’s Antibullying Law Should Be a Model for Other States, 
TIME (Sept. 6, 2011) http://ideas.time.com/2011/09/06/why-new-jerseys-antibullying-law-should-be-
a-model-for-other-states/ (explaining that the New Jersey law is an “important step forward in 
combating the bullying of young people”). See, e.g., Matt Friedman, Gov. Christie Signs ‘Anti-
Bullying Bill of Rights’, NJ.COM (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.nj.com/news/ 
index.ssf/2011/01/gov_christie_signs_anti-bullyi.html (“The bill sailed through the Assembly and 
Senate in November. It passed 73-1, with 5 abstentions, in the Assembly. It passed the Senate 30-
0.”). 
 12. See Emily Bazelon, Anti-Bullying Laws Get Tough with Schools (NPR radio broadcast 
Sept. 17, 2011), available at http://www.npr.org/2011/09/17/140557573/anti-bullying-laws-get-
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the executive director of the New Jersey Association of School 
Administrators, expressed concern with the statute, stating, “I think this 
has gone well overboard. . . . Now we have to police the community 24 
hours a day. Where are the people and the resources to do this?”13 
Is New Jersey’s law the future of our country’s anti-bully reform? Is 
this truly a model statute for all states to follow, as critics have 
suggested, or would it be better to invalidate this law while it is still 
new? This Comment analyzes New Jersey’s Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights 
under the First Amendment and argues that the biggest problem with the 
new law is not just its costs or heightened liability for New Jersey 
schools, but rather the statute’s increased regulation of off-campus 
speech. Although many states have made a push to extend anti-bullying 
legislation into the realm of cyber-space,14 New Jersey should not have 
joined the bandwagon so heartily and enacted legislation that has gone so 
far in chilling significant amounts of student speech on and off campus. 
Part II of this Comment will address the problem and the effects of 
bullying and suggest why the media’s reports on bullying may have a 
greater role than we realize in the bullying problem. Part III will give an 
overview of the relevant case law that governs student speech today and 
explain why lower courts across the country have been unable to find a 
clear standard to follow in this area. It will also discuss how the lack of 
clear direction from these cases creates the potentially statute-
invalidating issues of vagueness and overbreadth. Part IV will compare 
other states’ approaches to the bullying and cyberbullying problem with 
New Jersey’s approach in its new law, and discuss which, if any, is the 
best strategy. Finally, Part V will propose how New Jersey and other 
states can tailor their laws to avoid constitutional concerns and still 
effectively combat the problem of bullying by taking an ex-ante rather 
than an ex-post approach. 
 
tough-with-schools. But see Alexandra Rice, N.J. Schools Brace for Anti-Bullying Rules’ Impact, 
EDUC. WK. (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2011 /09/14/ 03bully.h31.html 
(stating that some administrators are concerned about the costs of the new legislation and the 
possibility of over-policing students); Hu, supra note 6 (stating that administrators are worried about 
the schools’ increased liability with the new law). 
 13. Hu, supra note 6. 
 14. See FLA. STAT. § 1006.147(2)(c) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.4(a) (2010); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 18-917A(2) (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8256(a)(2) (2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
525.080(1)(C) (West 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 370 (2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
121A.0695 (West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.356(2)(b) (2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-279.6(A) 
(2010); WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.300.285(2) (2010). 
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II. BULLYING: AN INCREASING PROBLEM? 
Bullying is an age-old problem, which seems so common that it does 
not even need to be defined. It occurs in every classic tale, from 
Shakespeare to Golding. The saying “kids will be kids” commonly 
accompanies stories of bullying and harassment in school; but this view 
of bullying is much too oversimplified, considering many of today’s 
sobering statistics. According to recent studies, one in five students are 
bullied each year, and those numbers increase to nine in ten for gay and 
lesbian students.15 Bullied students are five times more likely to be 
depressed than those who go to school unscathed, and 160,000 bullied 
students skip school every day out of fear of their oppressors.16 Further, 
in another dimension to the problem, recent studies reveal a strong link 
between school safety and academic success.17 These statistics show that 
millions of students suffer from bullying victimization, which creates an 
unsafe school environment and leads them to “perform poorly, skip 
classes, or drop out entirely.”18 
The Internet has exacerbated the bullying problem; statistics show 
that forty-three percent of ten- to eighteen-year-olds report being victims 
of cyberbullying.19 But many kids in this group fail to report or take 
action against these incidents20 because they are afraid to have their 
Internet privileges revoked or they feel their parents or adults at school 
 
 15. Jessica Bennett, From Lockers to Lockup, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 4, 2010, 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/10/04/phoebe-prince-should-bullying-be-a-
crime.html. 
 16. Id. See also Joel Baum, Gender, Safety and Schools: Taking the Road Less Traveled, 15 
U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 167, 168–69 (2011) (stating that twenty-three percent of California 
students reported being harassed because they were not “as masculine as other guys” or “as feminine 
as other girls,” and almost half of all transgender students reported skipping a class at least once in 
the past month and missing school because they felt uncomfortable or unsafe); OLWEUS BULLYING 
PREVENTION PROGRAM, http:// www.violencepreventionworks.org/public/bullying_effects.page (last 
visited Sept. 22, 2012) (stating that students who are bullied are more likely to experience 
depression, low self-esteem, health problems, poor grades, and suicidal thoughts; and students who 
bully others are more likely to get into frequent fights, steal and vandalize property, drink alcohol 
and smoke, report poor grades, perceive a negative climate at school, and carry a weapon). 
 17. Wallace, supra note 4, at 736. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Bethan Noonan, Crafting Legislation to Prevent Cyberbullying: The Use of Education, 
Reporting, and Threshold Requirements, 27 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 330, 335 (2011) 
(stating also that four to twenty-one percent of ten- to eighteen-year-olds are perpetrators of 
cyberbullying). 
 20. Id. at 336. Cyberbullying includes e-mail, instant messaging text or pictures, and posts on 
social networking sites, web pages, and blogs. The most common forms of cyberbullying are 
cyberstalking, harassment, denigration, flaming, impersonation, and outing. Id. at 333. 
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cannot help them.21 Cyberbullying victims suffer socially and 
emotionally, as they are less able to make and keep friends and usually 
exhibit signs of distress, depression, anxiety, and increased thoughts of 
suicide.22 
Dr. Dan Olweus, a leading research professor of psychology who is 
considered the pioneer of bullying research, defines bullying as including 
three important components: (1) “[b]ullying is aggressive behavior that 
involves unwanted, negative actions”; (2) “[b]ullying involves a pattern 
of behavior repeated over time”; and (3) “[b]ullying involves an 
imbalance of power or strength.”23 Dr. Olweus explains that bullying can 
take on many forms: verbal bullying, bullying through social exclusion 
or isolation, physical bullying, bullying through lies and false rumors, 
having money or other things taken or damaged by other students, being 
threatened or being forced to do things by students who bully, racial 
bullying, sexual bullying, and cyberbullying.24 Bullying can also 
negatively affect more than just those directly involved. Those who 
observe bullying may feel they are in an unsafe environment and may 
feel fearful, powerless to act, guilty for not acting, or tempted to 
participate.25 Similarly, schools with bullying issues may develop an 
environment of fear and disrespect, and may see increases in the number 
of students who have difficulty learning, who feel insecure, who dislike 
school, or who perceive that teachers and staff have little control and do 
not care about them.26 
The current bullying statistics are frightening, and bullying can have 
devastating results. But social scientists report that the bullying problem 
is “not more extreme, nor more prevalent, than it was a half-century 
ago.”27 Experts even suggest that the bullying problem has improved 
over the past decade.28 Further, although cyberbullying presents new 
kinds of challenges, this type of bullying still occurs a third less than 
traditional bullying.29 But with every reported suicide or bullying 
 
 21. Id. at 336. 
 22. Id. at 337. 
 23. OLWEUS, Resisting Bullying, supra note 16 (“A person is bullied when he or she is 
exposed, repeatedly and over time, to negative actions on the part of one or more other persons, and 
he or she has difficulty defending himself or herself.”). 
 24. Id. 
 25. OLWEUS, Bullying Effects, supra note 16. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Bennett, supra note 15. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
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statistic, society becomes more aware of the bullying problem and more 
inclined to want a drastic change. It is clear that something must be done, 
and state legislatures have been answering the call by enacting anti-
bullying statutes and increasingly intensifying those statutes’ severity 
and breadth.30 
By contrast, however, some critics argue that the intensity of today’s 
legislation, specifically New Jersey’s Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights, is not 
a necessary solution because it aims to solve a bullying problem that is 
bigger than what actually exists. Society’s reaction to bullying is what 
has changed over time, and such a change is not necessarily a positive 
thing as illustrated by “the helicopter parents who want to protect their 
kids from every stick and stone, the cable-news commentators who whip 
them into a frenzy, the insta-vigilantism of the Internet.”31 In fact, the 
media may have skewed our perception of this problem: 
[B]ullying is not just a social ill; it’s a “cottage industry” . . . complete 
with commentators and prevention experts and a new breed of legal 
scholars, all preparing to take on an enemy that’s always been there. 
None of this is to say that bullying is not a serious problem (it is), or 
that tackling it is not important. But like a stereo with the volume 
turned too high, all the noise distorts the facts, making it nearly 
impossible to judge when a case is somehow criminal, or merely 
cruel.32 
As Yamada suggests, bullying is a problem worth fighting; but 
fighting the problem is not something that should be taken to the 
extreme. Legislation is an important step in curtailing bullying in 
schools. But in deciding which legislation has gone too far, it is 
important to understand the truth of the statistics, the impact of the 
media, and the solutions that are already in place.33 
III. CASE LAW AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW JERSEY’S LAW 
One particularly problematic aspect of anti-bullying legislation is its 
infringement upon students’ constitutionally protected First Amendment 
freedoms of speech. Under the First Amendment there are only a few 
 
 30. See supra note 14. 
 31. Bennett, supra note 15. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See infra Part IV (detailing different approaches that states can take, and already have 
taken, to avoid over-legislation in the anti-bullying arena). 
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exceptions to the large body of protected speech34: obscenity,35 
defamation,36 public safety,37 incitement to riot,38 and the so-called 
“fighting words,”39 to name a few. “The rationale usually given for 
unprotected speech is that it contains no ideas or viewpoints and does not 
advance any socially worthwhile goal.”40 But there is another established 
category of speech—speech that is within the school setting—that is 
unprotected in some circumstances, not because the speech does not 
advance any socially worthwhile goals, but because it is imperative for 
schools to be able to regulate speech on their campuses. The four 
Supreme Court cases that address students’ First Amendment rights are 
considered rather canonical: Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District,41 Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,42 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,43 and Morse v. Frederick.44 
Although these four cases are continually regarded as binding 
precedent and are cited by most lower courts in free-speech cases within 
a school setting, the cases do not decipher many of the complexities of 
student speech within the First Amendment context. Rather, these cases 
are at most a good framework for First Amendment analysis, as they fail 
to clearly define exactly when and how to apply their rules. The 
deficiencies in these cases, which mainly come from a lack of clear 
direction, have been the basis for much confusion in the lower courts, 
“particularly when the speech involves the Internet or other new 
media,”45 or when it extends off campus. This section will discuss each 
of the four cases and explain why each fails to provide appropriate 
direction for legislators wanting to make anti-bullying laws that are 
consistent with judicial precedent. 
 
 34. Hayward, supra note 4, at 102. 
 35. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 36. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 37. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
 38. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357 (1997). 
 39. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
 40. Hayward, supra note 4, at 102. 
 41. 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969). 
 42. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 43. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 44. 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 45. Lee Goldman, Student Speech and the First Amendment: A Comprehensive Approach, 63 
FLA. L. REV. 395, 396 (2011) (citing several different lower court cases that have had very similar 
facts but different outcomes). 
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A. Tinker and the Birth of the “Substantial Disruption” Doctrine 
In Tinker, students sued their school district seeking an injunction 
and nominal damages after school officials suspended them for wearing 
black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam War.46 The Eighth 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint, which 
upheld the school authorities’ actions on the ground that the armband 
prohibition was reasonable to prevent the disturbance of school 
discipline.47 But the Supreme Court reversed and held that the students’ 
conduct was not disruptive and therefore was considered “pure speech,” 
entitled to full First Amendment protection.48 The Court articulated that 
it would be absurd to assume that students or teachers “shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate”49 and held that the state’s interest in eliminating 
disturbances in schools is “not enough to overcome the right to freedom 
of expression.”50 The Court emphasized that schools could not justify 
restricting otherwise protected student speech for only an 
“undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance”51 or “a mere 
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always 
accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”52 
The Court did recognize, however, the necessity of some limitations 
on student speech and held that student speech may be prohibited when it 
“materially and substantially interfer[es] with the requirements of 
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,”53 or if it “collid[es] 
with the rights of others.”54 Accordingly, the Court protected the 
student’s speech in this case because there was no substantial disruption 
from a student passively wearing a symbolic armband. 
Although the Court’s failure to define substantial disruption or 
interference here did not alter the outcome of this particular case, 
because the conduct involved was clearly not a substantial disruption,55 
 
 46. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
 47. Id. at 505. 
 48. Id. at 505–06. 
 49. Id. at 506. 
 50. Id. at 508. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 509. 
 53. Id. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 54. Id. (citing Blackwell v. Issaquena Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
 55. Hayward, supra note 4, at 103 (“[W]hen wearing armbands the petitioners were quiet and 
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the absence of a definition of the commonly quoted phrase “substantial 
disruption” causes significant problems in many student speech cases 
today. This substantial-disruption doctrine is the “most widely used 
standard applied at the lower-court level to online student speech”56 and 
is the most commonly used phrase in state anti-bullying statutes; but the 
phrase has never been defined in a way to avoid discretionary legislation 
and court rulings. Moreover, without clear parameters, the popularly 
cited doctrine is potentially facially overbroad and void for vagueness, 
which is seen even more easily when applied to off-campus student 
speech.57 
B. Fraser’s Classification of the Lewd and Obscene 
Tinker’s substantial-disruption test has become the “hallmark of 
student speech cases because of its application to student speech inside 
and outside of school”;58 but the Court has also established three 
separate rules, which further articulate the parameters of student speech. 
In Fraser, a student gave a speech at a school election assembly, which 
all the students of the school were required to attend. During his speech, 
the student used “elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual” language59 and, 
as a result, was suspended for violating a school disciplinary rule that 
prohibited “conduct which materially and substantially interfere[d] with 
the educational process . . . including the use of obscene, profane 
language or gestures.”60 Although both the district court and the court of 
appeals found the student’s speech constitutionally protected according 
to the Tinker precedent, the Supreme Court reversed. The Court 
acknowledged Tinker in its decision by affirming that students retain 
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression even in a 
school setting; but the Court expressed the need to balance this freedom 
to advocate unpopular and controversial views in school with “the 
 
passive. They were not disruptive, and did not impinge upon the rights of others.”). 
 56. Noonan, supra note 19, at 339. 
 57. See Goldman, supra note 45, at 405 (stating that while most lower courts have “applied 
the ‘substantial disruption’ standard to off-campus speech and find such speech unprotected when it 
reasonably may cause substantial disruption at the school,” these lower court decisions fail to 
identify how a court should determine what constitutes a “‘substantial disruption’ beyond almost 
meaningless general statements”). 
 58. Noonan, supra note 19, at 341. 
 59. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677–78 (1986). 
 60. Id. at 678. 
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boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.”61 The Court did not 
overturn Tinker, but established a new rule that identified lewd and 
offensive student speech as constitutionally unprotected. Thus, this rule 
demonstrated that “the constitutional rights of students in public schools 
are not co-extensive with those of non-students in other settings, and 
[that] Tinker’s mode of analysis was not the sole analytical approach in 
school speech cases.”62 
The Fraser rule gives even less insight than does the Tinker rule in 
suggesting how courts should approach student speech cases, especially 
those dealing with off-campus speech. Even so, a comparison of the two 
cases demonstrates that pure political speech (like that in Tinker) is more 
likely to be protected than other types of speech, and that vulgar and 
obscene speech (like that in Fraser) will be unprotected. Although 
bullying does not completely fit within either of these categories, the 
significantly low value of speech and expression of bullying seems to 
make it more akin to the low-level of speech in Fraser. There is no 
indicator that the rule in Fraser permeates, in any way, the realm of off-
campus speech. However, the speech in Fraser is similar enough or akin 
to the constitutionally unprotected category of obscenity, which can be 
prohibited off campus in ways other than school regulations. Therefore, 
because the speech in Fraser can be regulated by other means, there is no 
real need for the Fraser rule to extend off campus. By contrast, however, 
bullying in the majority of cases does not fit within a category of 
unprotected speech, like obscenity,63 so the Supreme Court should give 
more specific direction on how to apply its rules to the difficult 
cyberbullying contexts, while still maintaining students’ First 
Amendment rights. 
C. Hazelwood 
In Hazelwood, students brought suit in federal district court alleging 
that their First Amendment rights were violated when the school deleted 
two pages from a student newspaper, which included one article about 
students’ experiences dealing with pregnancy and another article about 
the impact of divorce on students.64 The newspaper had been written and 
 
 61. Id. at 681. 
 62. Goldman, supra note 45, at 402. 
 63. See infra Part V (suggesting that perhaps bullying could fit within the categories of 
fighting words or true threats). 
 64. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 260 (1988). 
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edited as part of a class, but the principal was worried because the 
content indirectly identified several students and directly identified a 
student’s father.65 At the time the supervising teacher submitted page 
proofs of the newspaper, the principal believed that there was not enough 
time for the students to make necessary changes before printing, so he 
deleted the pages.66 The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit’s 
decision that a First Amendment violation had occurred, finding that the 
school had acted within its authority in regulating the newspaper’s 
content.67 
In its decision, the Court articulated three major points. First, the 
First Amendment rights of students in public schools “are not 
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,”68 
and those rights must be “applied in light of the special characteristics of 
the school environment.”69 Therefore, “[a] school need not tolerate 
student speech that is inconsistent with its ‘basic educational mission,’ 
even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the 
school.”70 Second, the school newspaper at issue could not be 
characterized as a forum for public expression; therefore, the school 
could impose reasonable restrictions on the speech of students, teachers, 
and other members of the school community.71 And third, the standard 
for determining when a school may punish student expression that 
happens to occur on school premises is not “the standard for determining 
when a school may refuse to lend its name and resources to the 
dissemination of student expression.”72 
The Hazelwood rules, as articulated by the Court, discuss another 
layer of analysis, beyond the two prior cases, for understanding students’ 
First Amendment rights. However, these rules do not provide complete 
direction for anti-bullying legislation specifically. Schools can apply the 
first Hazelwood rule and prohibit bullying on campus on the basis that 
bullying is not consistent with “the special characteristics of the school 
 
 65. Id. at 262–63. 
 66. Id. at 263–64. 
 67. Id. at 276. 
 68. Id. at 266 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 69. Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 70. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).  
 71. Id. at 267–69 (explaining that the only way to create a public forum is by intentionally 
opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse). 
 72. Id. at 272–73. 
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environment”; but this rule does not provide specific guidance for off-
campus regulation. Schools can also apply the second and third 
Hazelwood rules to prohibit bullying that may occur in any school 
medium (e.g., a school newspaper or a school website); but neither rule 
offers direction for private mediums. By contrast, the Court’s holding 
suggests that public forums (e.g., email, Facebook, Twitter, etc.) should 
be open for all student speech regardless of harmful content; therefore, 
the second and third Hazelwood rules are not intended to apply to off-
campus speech. 
D. Morse 
Finally, in Morse, the most recent case dealing with the First 
Amendment rights of student speech, the Court followed its trend of 
giving schools even more regulatory power.73 Here, the Court rejected a 
student’s claim that his conduct, unfurling a banner that stated “BONG 
HiTS 4 JESUS,” was protected under the First Amendment.74 The 
student had displayed the banner off campus at a school-sanctioned and 
school-supervised event, and the principal—who considered the banner 
as promoting illegal drug use in violation of school policy—had 
confiscated the banner and suspended the student when he refused to 
take it down.75 While the district court held that there was no First 
Amendment infringement, the Ninth Circuit held that even though the 
banner promoted drug use and occurred during a school-authorized 
event, the student’s speech was protected because his speech did not 
constitute a substantial disruption.76 
However, the Supreme Court in this case reversed the appellate 
court’s decision and held that the prohibition did not violate the First 
Amendment because schools may take steps to safeguard those entrusted 
to their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging 
illegal drug use,77 and because the speech was considered on-campus.78 
To support this holding, the Court stated that the nature of students’ 
rights depends on “what is appropriate for children in school,”79 a 
 
 73. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 393 (2007). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 397–98. 
 76. Id. at 399. 
 77. Id. at 408. 
 78. Id. at 400–01. 
 79. Id. at 394 (quoting Veronica Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655–656 (1995)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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standard that in this case includes the “important—indeed, perhaps 
compelling” interest in deterring drug use by school children.80 Because 
drug abuse is a serious national problem and because Congress has 
declared that it is part of a school’s job to educate against such abuse, 
both “[t]he ‘special characteristics of the school environment,’ and the 
governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse allows schools to 
restrict student expression” that encourages such use.81 The Court also 
articulated that the speech could be regulated because it was “school 
speech”: the event had occurred during normal school hours and had 
been sanctioned by the principal as an approved social event where 
school rules would apply.82 
Although factually different from bullying, this case provides a bit 
more direction for anti-bullying legislation than earlier Supreme Court 
precedent. First, Morse defines, though in a limited way, what can be 
regulated in schools. The Court articulated that if there is a “compelling” 
governmental interest in prohibiting a certain type of behavior or speech 
for children in school, then it is reasonable and acceptable for schools to 
prohibit that speech or conduct. Bullying surely fits into a category of 
speech or conduct that the government has a strong interest in 
regulating.83 Second, Morse broadened the classification of on-campus 
speech. Although the Court did not specify exclusively what is and is not 
considered on-campus regulation, it did say that a school-sanctioned 
event that takes place during school hours fits within this category. Thus, 
the language of Morse gives further justification and direction for anti-
bullying legislation on campus. At the same time, however, it—like the 
other Supreme Court cases in this area—fails to give any specific 
direction for off-campus regulation. 
E. Vagueness and Overbreadth 
One enduring rule in Supreme Court jurisprudence is the requirement 
that legislation be appropriately tailored (not overbroad), and sufficiently 
clear (not vague). In light of this, it is ironic that the holdings in these 
four cases provide language that, when adopted by legislators, inspires 
 
 80. Id. at 407 (quoting Veronica, 515 U.S. at 661) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 81. Id. at 395 (citation omitted) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 
U.S. 503, 506 (1969))  
 82. Id. at 400–01. 
 83. See Safe Schools Improvement Act of 2010, S. 3739, 111th Cong. (2010). 
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state legislation that is both overbroad and vague.84 Lower courts are 
also left to their own discretion in determining what the language from 
these cases means. The discretionary nature of the language has created a 
large discrepancy among courts as to what constitutes permissible speech 
regulation and what does not. In addition, the large majority of state 
legislators have relied on these cases to create student-rights legislation, 
specifically anti-bullying legislation. As would be expected, these states 
use the Supreme Court’s exact language—language which has not been 
defined or qualified—thereby creating the potential for constitutional 
problems under the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines. Although, 
admittedly, state legislators must engage in some degree of guesswork 
because the Supreme Court has not ruled specifically on off-campus 
bullying, nor more specifically on cyberbullying, the language from 
these four cases is still too overbroad and vague because it does not 
provide specific parameters for states to accurately use the Court’s 
rulings. 
The definitions of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines are fairly 
straightforward; but it is helpful to articulate the doctrines before 
continuing with this analysis. In United States v. Williams, the Supreme 
Court stated that a statute is unconstitutionally overbroad if it chills “a 
substantial amount of protected speech” relative to the statute’s plainly 
legitimate sweep.85 Also, in Grayned v. City of Rockford, the Court held 
that a statute may be impermissibly vague for two independent reasons. 
First, if the statute does not give a “person of ordinary intelligence” a fair 
notice of what is prohibited, and second, if the statute does not “provide 
explicit standards” for those who apply the law to prevent arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.86 
The language from Tinker, which has been adopted in a great 
majority of state cyberbullying statutes,87 presents the biggest 
 
 84. See Hayward, supra note 4, at 92 (stating that cyberbullying statutes are often so vague 
that they offer no guidance to distinguish permissible from impermissible speech: “[T]hese laws do 
not simply ‘chill’ student free speech, they plunge it into deep freeze.”); see also Goldman, supra 
note 45, at 405 (explaining that most lower courts have applied the “substantial disruption” standard 
to off-campus speech and find such speech unprotected when it reasonably may cause substantial 
disruption at the school, though most lower courts still fail to identify how a court should determine 
whether there is a “substantial disruption”). 
 85. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008). 
 86. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). 
 87. For example, see ALA. CODE §§ 16-28B-1 to -9 (2010); ALASKA STAT. 14 §§ 33.200 to 
.250 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514 (2010); CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 32260, 48900.4 (West 2010); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 370 (2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 193-F:2 to -F:10 (2010); N.D. 
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overbreadth and vagueness problems with its oft-quoted “substantial 
disruption” phrase. This is because the Court fails to define the phrase or 
give any guidance toward its use. Although the standard is not as 
substantially overbroad in an on-campus setting, and although the Court 
did not necessarily intend the standard to be used in off-campus 
situations, many laws have adopted the language and used it to 
encompass any bullying which occurs on or off campus—effectively 
regulating speech and expression that is First-Amendment protected. 
Furthermore, the standard proves extremely vague when subjected to the 
Grayned test: no person of ordinary intelligence would have fair notice 
of what constitutes “substantial disruption,” and as was articulated in 
Tinker, the standard fails to provide any sub-standards to direct law 
enforcement officials on how to apply the law. Thus, the “substantial 
disruption” test as it stands today covers far too much protected speech 
and expression. Consider, for example, the following scenarios where 
prohibiting language causing substantial disruption could seriously 
inhibit free speech: 
A letter to the editor of the New York Times criticizing a school’s 
choice of curriculum can create a substantial disturbance on campus. 
Such a letter may result in a flood of calls to administrators or even 
make adoption of the school’s curriculum choice impossible. Similarly, 
the “substantial disruption” test could allow the government to punish 
students for watching popular television shows or reading particular 
magazines, newspaper articles, or books for fear that discussion at 
school of such normally protected speech will disrupt classes or 
interfere with the fundamental values that the school seeks to teach.88 
Therefore, for on-campus speech and especially for off-campus 
speech, Tinker’s “substantial disruption” standard must be qualified to 
avoid laws which will surely be facially void for vagueness and 
overbreadth. 
Although the three other Supreme Court cases—Fraser, Hazelwood, 
and Morse—articulate different rules, they still rely on the Tinker 
decision and thus still fail to describe the meaning of the phrase 
“substantial disruption” themselves. However, for the most part, the rules 
from these cases have the same likelihood to produce legislation that is 
 
CENT. CODE § 15.1-19-17 to -22 (2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.356 (2010); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 
13-1303.1-A (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-6-1014 to -19 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE § 
28A.300.285 (2010). 
 88. Goldman, supra note 45, at 408. 
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on its face vague and overbroad. Constitutional problems arise when 
state statutes extend those case rulings to off-campus cases because they 
have no other rulings on which to rely. Overall, the problem in the realm 
of student speech cases is the lack of clarity. Without much clarity in 
these cases, lower courts and legislators are forced to use their own 
discretion to apply case rulings to varieties of situations. 
Within the bullying context, statistics show that bullying in schools 
must be prohibited and that school anti-bullying laws must target off-
campus cyberbullying in some way or another; but these laws must still 
be written in a clear and concise way. Clear rules provide “predictability 
and reduce the need for litigation. . . . [Moreover,] the value of clarity in 
this area is particularly acute. Unclear rules risk chilling speech.”89 
Although bullying is a problem that must be addressed, the Court and 
state legislators must consider how to delicately balance that concern 
with students’ First Amendment rights. 
IV. STATES TO THE RESCUE: AN OVERVIEW OF ANTI-BULLYING 
LEGISLATION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY 
In response to recent events and the growing societal concerns of 
bullying in our education system, forty-eight states90 have enacted anti-
bullying laws.91 However, the breadth and depth of these statutes vary 
 
 89. Id. at 407. 
 90. The two states without anti-bullying legislation are Montana and South Dakota. See 
supra note 5. 
 91. See ALA. CODE §§ 16-28B-1 to -9 (2010); ALASKA STAT. 14 §§ 33.200 to .250 (2010); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341(37) (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514 (2010); CAL. EDUC. CODE 
§§ 32260, 48900.4 (West 2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-109.1 (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-
222d (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4112D (2010); FLA. STAT. § 1006.147 (2010); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 20-2-751.4 (2010); HAW. S.B. NO. 2094 (2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-917A (2010); 105 
ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/27-23.7 (2010); IND. CODE §§ 20-33-8-0.2, 20-33-8-13.5 (2010); IOWA CODE 
§ 280.28 (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8256 (2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.080(l)(C) (West 
2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.13 (2010); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 20A, § 1001(15)(H) (2010); 
MD. CODE ANN. EDUC. §§ 7-424 to -424.3 (West 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 370 (2010); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1310b (2010); MINN. STAT. § 121A.0695 (2010); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 
37-11-67 to -69 (2010); MO. REV. STAT. § 160.775 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-267 (2010); NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 388.135 (2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 193-F:2 to -F:10 (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 18A:37-15 to -21 (West 2010); 2010 N.J. Sess. Law. Serv. ch. 122 (West); N.M. ADMIN. CODE § 
6.12.7 (2010); N.Y. EDUCATION LAW §§ 10, 2801 (McKinney 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-
407.15 to 407.18 (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-19-17 to -22 (2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 
3313.666 to .667 (West 2010); OKLA. ST. tit. 70, § 24-100.4 (2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.356 
(2010); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 13-1303.1-A (2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-21-34 (2010); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 59-63-140 (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-6-1014 to -19 (2010); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. 
§§ 25.0342, 37.001 (West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-11a-101 to -401 (West 2010); VT. 
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quite significantly from state to state, as would be expected. Although it 
is unnecessary for this Comment to substantially examine each state’s 
statute, a categorical analysis that surveys the statutes more collectively 
is appropriate and helpful for further discussion and analysis of effective 
statutory regulation. To discuss the different statutes, this Comment 
groups the several states’ regulations into a gradient scale of three 
categories—light, medium, and harsh—depending on the amount and 
type of restrictions in the statutes.92 Because certain states have a 
combination of elements from two or more distinct categories, this 
categorization of states is somewhat generalized and fluctuant, and may 
not include every state. However, for the purposes of this Comment, 
these broad generalizations aid in an analysis of the trends in state 
statutes. 
A. Light Regulations: Not Light Problems 
In the first category, which is composed of statutes with regulations 
that are too light, the statutes are much too sparse to effectively define 
the type of speech they regulate. As a result, these laws could cause 
serious constitutional issues.93 The states in this category have created 
anti-bullying laws, and some have even included electronic 
communication in those laws; but overall, the laws fall very short of 
either comprehensively defining bullying or providing schools with 
effective solutions to regulate the bullying problem. Thus, the statutes in 
this category are ineffective because they fail to provide a clear 
description of bullying, and, more importantly, fail to articulate when 
and where bullying can be regulated. Another concern with this 
category’s sparse restrictions is the absence of any anti-bullying training 
programs. Many statutes require school-wide training policies, but most 
fail to require educational training programs94 for teachers or students, 
 
STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 11, 565 (2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-279.6 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE § 
28A.300.285 (2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18-2C-1 to -5 (2010); WIS. STAT. § 118.46 (2010); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4-311 to -314 (2010). See also supra note 5 (giving an overview of which 
states have anti-bullying laws, which states have included cyberbullying, electronic harassment, 
criminal sanctions, or school sanctions in their laws, and which states require additional school 
policies). 
 
 93. This light category includes Florida, Iowa, Idaho, Louisiana, New Mexico, Texas, 
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See supra note 91. 
 94. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.13 (2010) (failing to include a training program 
requirement, an indication of when and where bullying can be regulated, and a regulation of 
electronic communication or cyberbullying); N.M. ADMIN. CODE § 6.12.7 (2010); TEX. EDUC. CODE 
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which would ensure that schools take an active and preemptive stance 
against bullying. 
Virginia’s anti-bullying statute, for example, requires each school 
board to “include in its code of student conduct, prohibitions against 
bullying, hazing, and profane or obscene language or conduct.” Instead 
of providing definitions of “bullying,” “hazing,” etc., or clarifying any 
other details of the required prohibitions, the statute leaves each Virginia 
school district to its own judgment. The statute does not explain how 
harsh to make school prohibitions, nor does it mention how far the 
prohibitions can extend.95 Thus, without any language to determine the 
boundaries of when and where to regulate, school districts are left to 
their own discretion to determine when they can and cannot regulate 
bullying. This grant of discretion is problematic on two extremes: school 
officials may not know when they can regulate, thereby choosing either 
not to regulate at all, or choosing to regulate anything within the 
definition of bullying, regardless of when and where it takes place—very 
easily unconstitutionally regulating the First Amendment rights of 
students based on the vagueness and over-breadth doctrines.96 
B. Medium Regulations: Almost Just Right 
The second category of statutes, the medium group, comprises the 
vast majority of states’ statutes. These statutes have language that, for the 
most part, addresses most of the bullying concerns and also provides 
students constitutional First Amendment protection. As a general rule, 
these statutes require school districts to implement anti-bullying policies 
and relevant training programs for both students and teachers. However, 
what makes these statutes significantly more successful in targeting the 
bullying problem within acceptable First Amendment limits than those in 
the light category is the definition of exactly where and when schools can 
regulate bullying. 
 
ANN. § 37.001 (2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-279.6 (2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18-2C-1 to -5 
(2010) (encouraging, but not requiring the implementation of a bullying task force). 
 95. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-279.6 (2010); see also WIS. STAT. § 118.46 (2010) (failing to 
give any directions to school districts of how to design an anti-bullying statute and what to include in 
such a statute). 
 96. See Noonan, supra note 19, at 332 (“The majority of cyberbullying legislation gives 
schools wide discretion in determining when, if at all, administrators can intervene. The methods 
that each state uses to deal with cyberbullying, coupled with the wide discretion given to schools to 
handle the problem, leave many children free to cyberbully and their victims unable to escape.”). 
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1. The “true medium” group 
This category of statutes can be divided further into two 
subcategories. The first group, labeled the “true medium” group for the 
purposes of this Comment, does not mention cyberbullying or electronic 
communication regulations at all, and includes no language that 
expressly allows the regulation of off-campus speech.97 Therefore, this 
group of statutes provides students the most First Amendment protection 
of any other category because students’ off-campus speech and 
expression cannot be regulated at all. However, these statutes are weak in 
regulating bullying because they fail to even acknowledge the growing 
problem of cyberbullying, which, as noted earlier, occurs almost 
exclusively off campus. Thus, although these statutes do not mention any 
off-campus regulations, it is inevitable that the school districts in these 
states will encounter off-campus bullying and will be unable to act. It can 
be argued, however, that in a few of these statutes there may be an 
implied ability to regulate off-campus bullying. This implied right stems 
from the “substantial disruption” language adopted from Tinker. 
However, the few statutes that do include this “substantial disruption” 
language are still weak, because they fail, as did the Supreme Court, to 
define what constitutes a “substantial disruption.” 
Tennessee’s anti-bullying law, for example, confines the regulation 
of bullying solely to on-campus acts. In its statute, it says that 
harassment, intimidation, or bullying means “any act that substantially 
interferes with a student’s educational benefits, opportunities or 
performance, that takes place on or immediately adjacent to school 
grounds, at any school-sponsored activity, on school-provided 
transportation, or at any official school bus stop.”98 Here, Tennessee 
uses the “substantial” language, but uses it to qualify only on-campus 
speech. While this approach does effectively protect students’ First 
Amendment rights off campus, it seems to avoid the concerning 
complexity of the cyber-world. Similarly, Indiana’s statute provides 
details which confine regulations to  
school grounds immediately before or during school hours, 
immediately after school hours, or at any other time when the school is 
being used by a school group; off school grounds at a school activity, 
 
 97. This true medium group includes Alaska, Wyoming, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
North Dakota, Ohio, and Tennessee. See supra note 91. 
 98. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1015 (2010) (emphasis added). 
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function, or event; traveling to or from school or a school activity, 
function, or event; or using property or equipment provided by the 
school.99  
Yet, even this law could be more effective by mentioning home 
electronic equipment and the regulation of cyberbullying. Consequently, 
because the statutes in this category do not give any clear directions 
regarding regulating off-campus bullying or interpreting behavior that 
“substantially disrupts” school functions, school districts are left without 
the tools to effectively solve the bullying problem—especially off 
campus—and are forced to take their own discretionary measures. 
2. The “medium plus” group 
The second subcategory in this group, or the “medium plus” group 
for purposes of this section, includes the regulation of cyberbullying or 
electronic communication.100 Like the “true medium” group, however, 
these statutes do not expressly allow the regulation of off-campus speech 
in their descriptions of where bullying can be regulated.101 Although this 
group technically provides less First Amendment protection than does 
the true medium group (because the statutes regulate cyberbullying and 
electronic communication), these statutes are more comprehensive and 
therefore more effectively alleviate the complexity of the multi-realm 
bullying problem. 
Although each statute in this medium plus group has slightly 
different characteristics and nuances, as a general rule, these statutes 
should be considered model anti-bullying statutes for the states. This is 
because these statutes do not expressly allow any off-campus regulation, 
but do recognize and mention electronic communication and 
cyberbullying in their laws. To reconcile this obvious discrepancy 
between recognizing cyberbullying in their laws, but not expressly 
allowing off-campus regulation, these statutes either allow the regulation 
of cyberbullying only on-campus, or allow the regulation of 
cyberbullying on or off campus if the conduct is “substantially disruptive 
 
 99. IND. CODE § 20-33-8-13.5 (2010). 
 100. Although there are only a few states that mention “cyberbullying” in their laws, see supra 
note 5, the vast majority of the states’ statutes encompass cyberbullying through synonymous terms. 
 101. This medium-plus group includes Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, and Wyoming. Supra note 
91. 
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to schools.” Furthermore, the best statutes in this group solve the 
problems of vagueness and overbreadth by explaining what “substantial 
disruption” actually means102—limiting its applications, and thereby 
eliminating the constitutional problems that have clouded the “substantial 
disruption” standard for years. Because these laws are organized to 
specifically allow only on-campus regulation and will make exceptions 
to this rule only if the off-campus bullying substantially disturbs school 
procedures, there is a presumption against regulating off-campus speech. 
Thus, while this presumption clearly allows school districts to regulate 
on-campus behavior, it also gives schools the tools they need to regulate 
off-campus if such regulation is imperative—according to the articulated 
criteria of “substantial disruption.” 
For example, Arkansas’ statute includes electronic bullying,103 but 
does not expressly allow off-campus regulation. This statute defines 
bullying as conduct that physically harms a student, teacher, or property; 
substantially interferes with a student’s education; creates a hostile 
educational environment due to the severity, persistence, or 
pervasiveness of the act; and substantially disrupts the orderly operation 
of the school or educational environment.104 Here, Arkansas does not 
expressly direct school districts to regulate off-campus speech, but 
indirectly allows regulation if the conduct substantially interferes with a 
student’s education. Also, Arkansas’ statute is more successful than 
others in this category because it defines what “substantial disruption” 
means: 
“Substantial disruption” means without limitation that any one (1) or 
more of the following occur as a result of the bullying: 
 
 102. For example, Alabama’s definition of harassment includes the “substantial disturbance” 
language, and although it does not provide a definition as clear as Arkansas’ statute, it provides 
parameters for the phrase by its specific definition and its context as part of a list: “To constitute 
harassment, a pattern of behavior may do any of the following: (a) Place a student in reasonable fear 
of harm to his or her person or damage to his or her property. (b) Have the effect of substantially 
interfering with the educational performance, opportunities, or benefits of a student. (c) Have the 
effect of substantially disrupting or interfering with the orderly operation of the school. (d) Have the 
effect of creating a hostile environment in the school, on school property, on a school bus, or at a 
school-sponsored function. (e) Have the effect of being sufficiently severe, persistent, or pervasive 
enough to create an intimidating, threatening, or abusive educational environment for a student.” 
ALA. CODE §§ 16-28B-3(2) (2010). 
 103. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514(3) (2010) (“‘Electronic act’ means without limitation a 
communication or image transmitted by means of an electronic device, including without limitation 
a telephone, wireless phone or other wireless communications device, computer, or pager.”). 
 104. Id. § 6-18-514(2). 
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(A) Necessary cessation of instruction or educational activities; 
(B) Inability of students of educational staff to focus on learning or 
function as an educational unit because of a hostile environment; 
(C) Severe or repetitive disciplinary measures are needed in the 
classroom or during educational activities; or 
(D) Exhibition of other behaviors by students or educational staff that 
substantially interfere with the learning environment.105 
Like the other statutes in this category, Arkansas’ statute has a 
presumption against regulating off-campus speech. However, it 
recognizes the need for some off-campus regulation in extreme 
circumstances and successfully defines a clear and easy-to-follow 
criterion for school districts. Therefore, these medium plus statutes are 
ideal because school districts can regulate only on-campus bullying, but 
have the tools necessary to solve off-campus problems should they arise. 
Additionally, schools are no longer left to their own discretion to decide 
when they can regulate off-campus speech. 
C. Harsh Regulations: States Have Gone Too Far 
The final category of regulations, those in the harsh category, 
comprises the fewest statutes, but has the most extreme and pervasive 
regulations.106 These statutes are similar to those in the medium group 
because most include the “substantial disruption” language and require 
school districts to implement anti-bullying training programs. But these 
statutes give students the least First Amendment protection because the 
statutes expressly direct school districts to regulate off-campus bullying. 
By contrast, the medium category of statutes maintains a presumption 
against off-campus regulation; here, the statutes favor regulating off-
campus speech, which arguably violates the First Amendment. 
For example, in addition to regulating on-campus behavior, 
Massachusetts’ statute prohibits bullying at “location[s], activit[ies], 
function[s] or program[s] that [are] not school-related, or through the use 
of technology or an electronic device that [are] not owned, leased or used 
by a school district or school.”107 Although Massachusetts qualifies this 
 
 105. Id. § 6-18-514(5). But see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-222d (2010) (failing to define 
“substantially disrupt”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8256 (2010). 
 106. This harsh group includes Colorado, Hawaii, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Vermont. 
Supra note 91. 
 107. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37O (b) (2010) (emphasis added). 
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regulation by suggesting that the off-campus conduct must “[create] a 
hostile environment at school for the victim, [infringe] on the rights of 
the victim at school or materially and substantially [disrupt] the 
education process or the orderly operation of a school,”108 the language 
of the statute has already created an unconstitutional presumption by 
specifically directing school officials to regulate off campus in the first 
place. Instead of keeping bullying regulation on campus and extending 
off campus only in attenuating circumstances—as does the medium 
category of statutes, this statute starts by regulating off campus and limits 
the school’s ability to regulate only if the conduct does not meet a certain 
criteria. Therefore, the statute is too harsh because schools can use their 
discretion to presume they can regulate off campus First-Amendment 
protected speech.109 
Finally, it is appropriate to consider New Jersey’s statute last. Just as 
many critics have stated, New Jersey’s anti-bullying statute is indeed one 
of the toughest anti-bullying statutes, and accordingly falls within this 
harsh category.110 In its definition of “harassment, intimidation, or 
bullying,” New Jersey’s statute includes acts which take place “on school 
property, at any school-sponsored function, on a school bus, or off school 
grounds as provided for in section 16 of P.L.2010 . . . that substantially 
disrupts or interferes with the orderly operation of the school or the rights 
of other students . . . .”111 Although New Jersey’s statute, like 
Massachusetts’, also has language that qualifies the school’s ability to 
regulate off-campus bullying, this language is not readily apparent. The 
major qualifications of the off-campus regulation can be found in section 
16 of P.L.2010. This section, however, is nearly impossible to find, and 
other than the qualifications found in that hidden section, the statute 
contains no other limitations on how far school’s can regulate off-
campus speech. The New Jersey statute, like many statutes in both the 
medium and harsh categories, includes the “substantial disruption” 
language; but it fails to define how to determine when conduct becomes 
substantially disruptive. Consequently, the language in New Jersey’s 
statute is on its face overbroad because it extends into the realm of 
constitutionally protected off-campus student speech, and does not 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. See also Bennett, supra note 15 (“[I]n Massachusetts, which has one of the strictest [anti-
bullying laws], anti-bullying programs are mandated in schools, and criminal punishment is outlined 
in the text for even the youngest offenders.”). 
 110. See supra note 5. 
 111. 2010 N.J. SESS. LAW SERV. ch. 122 (West). 
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provide any language, which limits the regulation’s scope. 
V. THE BIG FIX: HOW NEW JERSEY AND OTHER STATES CAN TAILOR 
THEIR LAWS 
In considering the Supreme Court’s First Amendment case law in 
conjunction with existing anti-bullying statutes, the question remains 
how to reconcile the two: what is the delicate balance between protecting 
students’ free speech rights and sufficiently regulating bullying in and 
out of schools? While the solution must come, to some extent, from 
legislation, the reality is that legislation cannot and should not be the 
complete answer. Instead the states should take an ex-ante approach and 
focus on education. Such an approach would not only avoid the 
constitutional ramifications that result from over-legislation, but would 
also take a preventative approach and eliminate bullying from the 
beginning instead of trying to solve the problems ex-post. 
A. Education Not Legislation 
Although students surely know about bullying, many are most likely 
unaware of its many different forms and the drastic ramifications it may 
have. Bullying is a serious issue, but the best way to eliminate the 
problem is through anti-bullying education, not legislation. Bullying and 
cyberbullying education is especially relevant to the concerns of this 
Comment because education eliminates the need to over-regulate in the 
realm of off-campus First Amendment protected speech, and additionally 
provides a more effective solution to the problems associated with 
bullying. 
Scholars have already shown the effectiveness of education in 
solving bullying-related issues. For example, Patricia W. Agatston, 
Robin Kowalski, and Susan Limber conducted research on students’ 
perspectives and responses to bullying, and their findings suggest that 
preventative messages targeting students, educators, and parents is the 
best way to fight against this seemingly unending battle.112 Surprisingly, 
this research revealed that students viewed bullying, specifically 
cyberbullying, as a problem, “but one rarely discussed at school,” and 
that students did not view “school district personnel as helpful resources” 
when combating the bullying challenges they faced.113 Although several 
 
 112. Patricia W. Agatston, Robin Kawalski & Susan Limber, Students’ Perspectives on Cyber 
Bullying, J. OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH S59, S59 (2007). 
 113. Id. 
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state statutes have required schools to adopt an already established anti-
bullying policy or create their own, the emphasis on these programs has 
not been strong enough and schools need to take an even more increased 
role in educating about bullying.114 “If we can change this culture in K-
12, hopefully we won’t have incidents by the time [students] are in 
college or in the workplace . . . that is what education is about, to teach 
our kids courtesy and respect as well.”115 
Yet another, equally compelling reason to focus on education and not 
legislation is the fact that making bullying or cyberbullying a crime “is a 
scare tactic that has proven to be ineffective,”116 and could actually have 
devastating results on students found guilty of cyberbullying. Most 
research and statistics fail to consider the negative consequences that 
stem from labeling students as bullies, whether or not those students 
were actually in the wrong. Although students must learn to take 
responsibility for their actions, labeling them as bullies, or even as 
criminals in the most extreme cases, “can have lasting effects not only on 
how they will later be able to fit into social order and re-establish 
themselves in the community, but also on their future educational 
endeavors.”117 Focusing more on educational programs will shift 
schools’ attention to informing students about bullying and its 
consequences, rather than pointing fingers and assessing blame, and will 
therefore ultimately protect more students by creating safer, more 
constructive school environments.118 
As would be expected, an educational approach to the overall 
bullying problem is also a necessary step in reducing the cyberbullying 
 
 114. It is important to note, that there are many states, including New Jersey, which do have 
extremely stringent anti-bullying training and education programs; however, for the most part, these 
states have also over-legislated in an unacceptable way. The important thing for states to do is to find 
the balance between education and legislation. 
 115. Monsy Alvarado, Halting Bullies is New Priority, NORTHJERSEY.COM (Sept. 5, 2011), 
http://www.northjersey.com/news/129283053_Halting_bullies_is_new_priority. html (quoting Frank 
Belluscio of the New Jersey School Boards Association, explaining what New Jersey’s new 
legislation aims to accomplish) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 116. Noonan, supra note 19, at 358. 
 117. Id. See also Bennett, supra note 15 (explaining that the “bullies” responsible for Tyler 
Clementi’s death face up to five years in prison, with potentially more charges, and asking where is 
the line between behavior that is bad and behavior that is criminal). 
 118. Bazelon, supra note 4, at 1–2 (describing how those charged with bullying Phoebe Prince 
have suffered as a result of their charges: “The charges turned the six students into international 
symbols of callow teenage evil. . . . They were kicked out of school. Sean lost a football scholarship 
to college. They are all facing pretrial proceedings in September, with the possibility of prison time 
if they’re convicted.”). 
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problem that has become rampant in schools over the past decade. 
Although they are experts with various technological devices, from cell 
phones to Facebook, students—especially those who are younger—are 
unaware of the “social and moral ramifications”119 that can result from 
these devices. So much harm can occur simply by clicking a mouse or 
sending a text, and students need to be aware of these potential 
consequences. Specifically, schools should encourage the safe and 
considerate use of computers and other equipment by educating their 
staff and students about the do’s and don’ts of online and computer 
communication, and encouraging parents to go online with their children 
and monitor their activities.120 
Although schools seem to be the most obvious arena to target the 
bullying problem, one important consideration is to educate community-
wide, by getting parents and community members involved in the anti-
bullying education process. Richard Bozza, the executive director of the 
New Jersey Association of School Administrators, critiqued New 
Jersey’s law by explaining that bullying “is not a school issue,” but is a 
“community issue” that should be addressed as a community.121 Indeed, 
schools that are successful in combating the bullying problem share 
several features: “strong leadership, clearly articulated and enumerated 
anti-discrimination policies, a commitment to training for all parts of the 
community, consistent reinforcement of positive school culture and 
nimble systems of communication.”122 Thus, critical to these stable, 
successful schools is both a specific anti-bullying policy—which is 
where legislation is necessary—and the involvement of school and 
community leaders. Once students, their parents, and community 
members become aware of the bullying problem and the steps they can 
take to avoid and address the problems, bullying will finally become a 
solvable problem. Instead of attempting to legislate bullying and 
cyberbullying “out of existence (a quixotic dream),” schools and 
legislatures should choose a “more productive approach . . . that is 
proactive and educational.”123 
 
 119. Hayward, supra note 4, at 90. 
 120. Id. at 89 n.12. 
 121. Alvarado, supra note 115. 
 122. Joel Baum, Gender, Safety and Schools: Taking the Road Less Traveled, 15 U.C. DAVIS 
J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 167, 170 (2011). 
 123. Hayward, supra note 4, at 89–90 (providing a list of nine proposals to prevent 
cyberbullying from recurring: (1) not engaging the person by replying; (2) printing all online 
communications so that cyberbullying is documented; (3) changing screen names and sharing them 
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B. How Tailored Legislation Can Help 
Although education is the most effective way to solve the bullying 
problem, schools may still need some prodding and funding from 
legislation to actually get results. However, aside from establishing clear 
and specific anti-bullying policies, legislation should be viewed more as 
a safety valve, if and when problems occur, rather than the actual 
solution to bullying. The problem with current legislation is that it has 
become increasingly harsh, prohibiting—and at times—criminalizing 
more speech and expression, and ultimately creating even more 
problems.124 Therefore, instead of eliminating anti-bullying legislation 
altogether—which would surely wreak political havoc—and relying 
solely on educational measures, the most efficient and logical solution is 
to tailor existing legislation so that it works in conjunction with 
educational programs. 
When considering how to appropriately tailor legislation so as not to 
legislate past constitutional boundaries, we must look closely at what 
states are already doing successfully to determine what we really need to 
change. As established in the statutory analysis in Part IV, most states 
already require school districts to adopt an anti-bullying policy and 
several require schools to also train students, teachers, and staff about 
bullying.125 However, few statutes specify what such policies and 
training programs ought to include. In addition, only a few states have 
programs that take specific measures to hold schools responsible for their 
progress in these training programs. Consequently, in order to maintain 
unity among state school districts and to ensure that schools are actually 
implementing the policies and training articulated in the statutes, 
 
with selected friends and family only; (4) not sharing personal information in chat rooms; (5) 
contacting service providers to identify where negative emails originate; (6) thinking before sending 
a reply; (7) increasing parental awareness of online tools, applications, games, and other online 
materials used by their children; (8) involving teachers of children that are being cyber bullied; and 
(9) initiating comprehensive action by teachers, other school staff, students, parents, and community 
members). 
 124. See id. at 90. 
 125. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 14.33.200 to .250 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341(37) 
(2010); ARK. CODE ANN. 6-18-514 (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-109.1 (2010); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 10-222d (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.4 (2010); IOWA CODE § 280.28; KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 72-8256(c) (2010) (requiring only that “such plan shall include provisions for the training 
and education for staff members and students,” but giving no specifics regarding that plan); MO. 
REV. STAT. § 160.775(4) (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-407.15 to -407.18 (2010); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. §§ 3313.666 to .667 (West 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-21-34 (2010); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 59-63-140 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-11a-101 to -401 (West 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
16, §§ 11, 565 (2010); WASH REV. CODE § 28A.300.285 (2010). 
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legislation must include detailed and specific requirements for school 
districts’ policies; provide school districts with standardized training, 
materials for such training, or at least specific instructions to direct 
school districts in creating their own training; and require school districts 
to report back and remain accountable for their progress. 
Equally important to tailoring statutes to include educational 
policies, training, and accountability to current legislation, is tailoring 
statutes to avoid over-legislation—especially to resolve the First 
Amendment issues many statutes pose. As articulated in Part IV, each 
state takes a slightly different approach to anti-bullying legislation, but as 
a general rule, those statutes in the medium category share characteristics 
that are most ideal for anti-bullying legislation nationwide. Following the 
characteristics in the medium category, states have two options: (1) 
choose to regulate only on campus and find other ways to take care of 
off-campus bullying and cyberbullying; or (2) choose to regulate 
primarily on campus, but allow regulation off campus only if absolutely 
necessary, only if a certain, clearly articulated criterion is satisfied. 
Several scholars have argued that perhaps the first option is best 
because it offers full protection to students’ off-campus First 
Amendment rights by not allowing any off-campus regulation. One 
benefit to this type of statute is that it strengthens and validates schools’ 
on-campus regulations: 
Treating speech outside of school supervision as deserving of full First 
Amendment protection has the advantage of making restrictions on 
speech under school supervision more like a time, place, and manner 
regulation. By leaving other channels for student speech open, greater 
restrictions on student speech can be justified where they are truly 
needed.126 
By excluding any off-campus regulation, schools do not face the 
vagueness and overbreadth problems that come from other unclear 
statutes; but at the same time, these schools are confronted with the 
inability to provide necessary protection to students who are victims to 
off-campus bullying and cyberbullying. Many states and scholars have 
presented viable options to resolve this problem. 
For example, North Carolina’s statute does not allow schools to 
regulate any bullying or cyberbullying off campus; but it has established 
a cyberbullying law that is completely separate from school 
 
 126. Goldman, supra note 45, at 408. 
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legislation.127 Here, although schools in North Carolina can regulate only 
on campus, thereby maintaining students’ First Amendment rights, the 
state legislature has established additional legislation outside the school 
sphere to target the growing problem of off-campus cyberbullying. These 
additional off-campus regulations could be justified under the First 
Amendment through the “fighting words” or “true threat” doctrines and 
would not only keep school regulations within the school sphere, but 
would also provide a community-wide solution to the bullying problem. 
Because the fighting words doctrine requires that speech has the 
likelihood to provoke an immediate violent reaction, it is, to say the least, 
difficult to analogize to bullying.128 The true threat doctrine is more 
helpful. Under this doctrine, true threats, which are statements that 
communicate to a reasonable person a serious intent to cause a present or 
future harm,129 are entirely unprotected by the First Amendment.130 
Therefore, such a doctrine could provide relief to some bullying victims 
who cannot turn to schools for relief because of statutory prohibitions. 
But despite these out-of-school alternatives to regulating off-campus 
bullying, the second option—which instructs schools to regulate 
primarily on campus, but allows regulation off campus if a certain, 
clearly articulated criterion is satisfied—seems to be the most effective 
and the most accepted solution for tailoring anti-bullying legislation. 
This approach seems more effective than the first because many states 
already use it in some form, and this approach would require less 
tailoring to resolve the First Amendment problems that accompany much 
anti-bullying legislation. 
If state legislatures choose to tailor their anti-bullying legislation 
according to this second approach, they must clearly define where and 
when regulation of on-campus bullying can take place, and they must 
 
 127. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.1 (2009). 
 128. Cohen, supra note 11. See also Clay Calvert, Fighting Words in the Era of Texts, IMS, 
and E-mails: Can a Disparaged Doctrine Be Resuscitated to Punish Cyber-Bullies?, 21 DEPAUL J. 
ART TECH. & INTEL. PROP. L. 1, 12 (2011). But see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 
(1941) (holding that the state can restrict words which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to 
incite an immediate breach of the peace, which arguably could include bullying or cyberbullying). 
 129. Goldman, supra note 45, at 410 (explaining that the speaker need not actually intend to 
carry out the threat, but rather the doctrine is intended to protect individuals from the fear of violence 
and from the disruption that fear engenders); see also U.S. v. White, 670 F.3d 498, 524 (4th Cir. 
2012) (The “true threat” doctrine requires “proof of a specific intent to threaten,” but not proof of 
“intent to carry out the threat.”). 
 130. Emily Gold Waldman, Badmouthing Authority: Hostile Speech About School Officials 
and the Limits of School Restrictions, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 591, 599 (2011). 
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clearly articulate Tinker’s “substantial disturbance” doctrine to establish 
a threshold for how and when schools can regulate off-campus bullying 
and cyberbullying.131 “State-operated schools may not be enclaves of 
totalitarianism” and officials do not and should not have “absolute 
authority over their students”;132 therefore, it is imperative that anti-
bullying legislation establishes clear parameters for school regulation. 
The majority of states with statutes in the medium category already 
include language that clearly, and satisfactorily, defines their on-campus 
boundaries: on school grounds, in school vehicles, at designated school 
bus stops, at school-sponsored activities or events, etc. But only a few 
have defined the parameters of off-campus speech beyond a mere 
mention of the substantial-disturbance doctrine.133 Therefore, states must 
tailor their legislation to define what this doctrine means and how it can 
be applied. Only then will states be able to address both on- and off-
campus bullying concerns while, at the same time, eliminating the 
vagueness and overbreadth problems that currently exist in the majority 
of anti-bullying statutes. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Bullying in schools is a difficult problem that calls for immediate 
attention. But because of its natural implications on the First Amendment 
rights of students, solving the problem requires a very delicate balance 
from schools and legislators nationwide. 
So, is New Jersey’s harsh, new anti-bullying statute a model statute 
for the states? Not quite. Although critics of the statute worry that it 
imposes too many responsibilities—which include inherent costs—on 
teachers and the community, the statute is actually successful in 
providing a strong focus on anti-bullying education. In this particular 
aspect of the statute, the increased regulation is actually a positive 
change. But New Jersey’s legislation is not successful in other key 
aspects, namely its direct off-campus legislation, which infringes on 
students’ First Amendment rights not only because it extends beyond the 
school grounds, but also because it does so according to schools 
officials’ discretion. As the Supreme Court states in our leading case, 
Tinker: 
 
 131. See Noonan, supra note 19, at 34. 
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‘The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more 
vital than in the community of American schools.’ The classroom is 
peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’ The Nation’s future depends 
upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of 
ideas which discover truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than 
through any kind of authoritative selection.’134 
Because the First Amendment rights of students are vital rights, 
statutes, especially New Jersey’s, must be tailored to eliminate the 
vagueness and overbreadth problems. Fortunately, even though most 
states’ legislation have First Amendment complications at present, these 
states need only tailor a small part of their laws to make them First 
Amendment approved. Once states tailor their statutes and decide to take 
a more preventative approach, students across the United States will have 




 134. Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (citation omitted). 
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